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Embodied cognition represents one of most important theoretical developments in contemporary
cognitive science. Many cognitive processes appear to be influenced by body morphology,
emotions, and sensorimotor systems. This perspective is supported by an ever increasing collection
of empirical studies that fall into two broad classes: one consisting of experiments that implicate
action, emotion, and perception systems in seemingly abstract cognitive tasks and the other
consisting of experiments that demonstrate the contribution of bodily interaction with the external
environment to the performance of such tasks.
Now that embodied cognition is fairly well established, the time seems right for assessing its
further promise and potential limitations. This research topic aimed to create an interdisciplinary
forum for discussing where we go from here. Given that we have good reason to think that the
body influences cognition in surprisingly robust ways, the central question is no longer whether or
not some cognitive processes are embodied. Other questions have come to the forefront. To what
extent are cognitive processes embodied? Are there disembodied processes? Among those that are
embodied, how are they embodied? Is there more than one kind of embodiment? Is embodiment a
matter of degree?
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Many of the contributions to this research topic involve experiments that extend the empirical reach
of embodied cognition. For instance, Soliman et al. (2013) ambitiously propose that sensorimotor
mechanisms can unify explanations at cognitive, social, and cultural levels. They carried out two
experiments investigating whether anticipated motor effort can be used to understand cultural
differences. Building on earlier work by Proffitt and colleagues implicating an effect of perceived
motor effort on visual distance perception (for a review see Proffitt and Linkenauger, 2013), they
investigate a cultural motor-effort hypothesis in which relative degree of experience with out-group
members can lead to differences in perceived distance. In a commentary, Wilson (2014) suggests
that this effect conflicts with the task-relatedness of the effects found by Proffitt and colleagues.
Soliman and Glenberg (2014) respond by clarifying how they link their cultural-motor effort
hypothesis to the earlier work. Ultimately, further research is needed to settle these issues.
Much of the extant research on concepts within an embodied framework focuses on the binary
question of whether or not they are embodied as a general rule. Recently, researchers have come
to realize that embodiment might be context-dependent and come in degrees (e.g., Watson and
Chatterjee, 2011; Pulvermüller and Garagnani, 2014; Zwaan, 2014). With this potential flexibility
in mind, Watson et al. (2014) examined the sensorimotor specificity of action concepts elicited by
different exemplars and representational formats. They found that actions appear to be represented
at different levels of specifity by visual and motor systems and that the relative recruitment of some
sensorimotor brain regions may depend on the format of the stimuli.
Abstract concepts remain a serious challenge for embodied cognition (Dove, 2015). A couple of
the contributions address aspects of this challenge. Troche et al. (2014) defend a multidimensional
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approach to abstract concepts. Rather than rely on an
intuitive notion of abstractness, they investigated how the
meanings of 400 concrete and abstract English nouns are
distributed in a multidimensional space using hierarchical cluster
analysis. Participants rated the nouns along 12 dimensions.
Factor reduction yielded three latent factors that the authors
characterize as affective association, perceptual salience, and
magnitude. When the original words were plotted for these
three factors, abstract and concrete words were associated with
unique, but somewhat overlapping, topographies within this
space. Borghi et al. (2014) analyze how Italian Sign Language
(LIS, Lingua dei Segni Italiana) encodes abstract concepts. They
argue that the LIS data support the view that abstract concepts
are encoded in multiple ways. Some abstract concepts may rely
more on metaphors while others may rely more on situations,
emotions, or linguistic information.
Despite the clear affinity between constructivist views of
cognitive development and embodied cognition, the precise role
that embodiment may play in development remains an open
question. Corbetta et al. (2014) provide evidence suggesting that
the emergence of reaching is a fundamentally embodied process.
Infants appear to first learn to make such movements through the
haptic and proprioceptive feedback associated with self-produced
movements. Vision then maps onto this motor experience and
contributes to the emergence of prospective motor control.
Although it is not always acknowledged, the conceptual reframing of cognition as an embodied activity has important
implications with respect to methodology. Bahnmueller et al.
(2014) contend that near infrared spectroscopy (NIRS) is better
suited to investigating the role that motion plays in embodied
cognition than the more commonly used functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI).

that mathematical and logical reasoning often involves the
sensorimotor systems engaged by physical notations. Perceptual
processes exploiting the design features of physical notations
underwrite significant aspects of symbolic reasoning. Landy et
al. contend PMT is supported by the growing body of evidence
demonstrating the manifold ways that sensorimotor processes
can influence or interrupt the capacity for symbolic reasoning.
One of the insights behind embodied cognition is that
cognitive science has been overly concerned with higher-level
cognition. We should instead pay closer attention to lower-level
phenomena and consider the cognitive behavior of animals and
less complicated agents. When we do, the importance of the body
becomes apparent in ways that can be obscured when we focus
only on higher-level cognition. Such a bottom-up approach has
an underappreciated consequence: it raises significant questions
concerning the ontogenetic and phylogenetic emergence of
higher-level capacities.
On the ontogenetic front, Wellsby and Pexman (2014)
suggest that work needs to be done in order to integrate
embodied cognition with the large body of extant research
on the development of concepts and language processing in
children. They outline several important issues that need to be
addressed in order to carry out this research program. Using
ideas from radical embodied cognition (Chemero, 2009), Cowley
(2014) proposes that there is a symbiotic relationship between
linguistic embodiment and external verbal constraints. He offers
a distributed-ecological account of how language skills emerge
through the dynamic coordination of movement with verbal
patterns and social experience.
On the phylogenetic front, Stutz (2014) suggests that an
embodied approach can help illuminate the emergence of
central human phenotypes such as linguistic communication
and symbolic representation. His embodied niche-construction
(ENC) hypothesis holds that these are the result of the dynamic
co-evolution of embodied forms of cognition and changing
environmental interaction. More specifically, it maintains that
the capacity to form recursive iconic narratives was an important
evolutionary precursor to the emergence of both. Gapenne (2014)
defends the hypothesis that proprioception plays a fundamental
role in the co-constitution of the self and the world by a
cognitive system. He explicitly maintains that the coupling of
proprioception and action is an important development in the
phylogenesis of even simple organisms.

New Directions
Several of the contributions are theoretical in nature. These echo
many of the themes present in the experimental contributions
but also expand the scope of embodied cognition. Some propose
stronger versions of the embodiment thesis and others outline
new frameworks for integrating embodied cognition with other
disciplines.
Pouw et al. (2014) consider embodied theories of the
cognitive function of gestures. As they see it, standard embodied
accounts are too internalistic because they treat gestures as
the epiphenomenal outputs of the sensorimotor processes
involved in cognition. Pouw et al. argue that it would be more
perspicuous to view gestures in terms of embedded/extended
cognition (Kirsh, 1995; Clark, 2013; Wheeler, 2013) and treat
them as external tools that can replace or support internal
cognitive processes. In a related vein, Landy et al. (2014)
defend an embodied account of symbolic reasoning in which
external mathematical symbols and formulae serve as targets
for action and perception systems. This account, which they
refer to as Perceptual Manipulations Theory (PMT), suggests
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Conclusion
The aim of this research topic was to bring together experts
from multiple disciplines to discuss the future of embodied
cognition. The resulting contributions suggest that embodied
cognition is a robust and dynamic research program—one that
is focused on addressing recognized challenges, exploring new
empirical ground, and expanding its theoretical reach. Taken as a
whole, they demonstrate the ongoing fecundity of this approach.
Questions certainly remain, but that itself might be a good sign.
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